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Introduction
The first and second 'oil shocks', and the current
inflationary recession, have spawned a considerable
literature on the process of balance of payments
adjustment in the non-oil exporting low and middle
income countries (ldcs). The subject has been the
focus of attention for numerous expert groups convened
by international organisations. There is now a range of
proposals for improving the mechanisms for recycling
surpluses and counteracting deficits, and a number of
new initiatives within the international organisations
are already taking shape. This article is addressed to
an implication of the process which has received
surprisingly limited attention: the growing importance
of the particular models of economic structure and
policy which underly adjustment programmes. It will
be argued that new proposals for international recycling
and adjustment mechanisms could prove disadvantag-
eous for ldcs unless renewed consideration is given by
the ldcs themselves, international organisations, and
sympathetic development economists, to the short
and medium term macro-economic policy that underpins
any development strategy.
The International Monetary Fund has commonly
imposed pre-conditions and performance criteria for
its lending to member countries in support of balance
of payments adjustment. By this means, and through
its regular consultations with governments and monetary
authorities, the Fund has been instrumental in developing
and propagating a view of economic structure and
policy which may broadly be termed 'monetarist'. The
term 'monetarist' is not employed here pejoratively,
and the sense in which it may be applied to Fund-
supported programmes is defined below. It is argued
here that this view is growing in importance because
the Fund's role in balance of payments financing is
once again expanding, and because the proportion of
Fund facilities which involve terms of strict conditionality
has dramatically increased in recent years.
Conflict between the prescriptions of the IMF and the
apparent goals and policies of ldcs has a long history.
To some extent the conflict has been contrived:
governments, or factions within governments, often
prefer to blame the imposition of unpopular economic
measures upon some outside agency, even when they
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recognise the need for such measures. Nevertheless,
the conflict has been real enough to lead some
governments to avoid recourse to the Fund, or to
break off negotiations and forego needed balance of
payments support. In Latin America, local experience
led to the development of a detailed critique of Fund-
sponsored stabilisation programmes, based on the
'structuralist' approach to economic analysis and policy.
It was argued that the Fund's approach was biased in
favour of foreign investors and lenders, and against
lower-income groups and long-term national
development. Criticism drawn from this strand of
thinking continues to influence discussion of
conditionality and adjustment programmes. It is argued
here that such criticism has tended to ignore the
central place of a particular brand of economic theory
in Fund-supported programmes, and to underplay the
importance of a short and medium-term macro-
economic policy framework in mounting alternatives
to such programmes. This has sustained a series of
unproductive 'vicious circles' which now inhibit effective
lending programmes through multilateral institutions
in support of balance of payments adjustment at a
time when they are most needed.
Financing the Deficits Recent Experience
The financing of the non-oil ldc current account
deficits that appeared after the 1973-74 oil price rise
led to a substantial increase in the proportion of
private debt among total financing flows. The proportion
of non-debt-creating flows (ie direct private investment
and transfers, including grant aid) fell from nearly half
the total of $21 bn in 1973 to under one third of the
total of $69 bn by 1979. Similarly, the proportion of
official loans dropped from nearly 27 per cent to just
under 21 per cent over the same period. Long term
private debt, on the other hand, increased from just
under 27 per cent to nearly 44 per cent of the total
L International Monetary Fund 1981 a: 129, Table 23;
the totals referred to include current account deficits
and reserve increases j.
There was a corresponding change in the structure of
ldc indebtedness [International Monetary Fund
1981a:132, Table 27]. By 1979, private creditors
accounted for 58 per cent of total outstanding debts of
$322 bn; by comparison 29 per cent was accounted for
by governments and 13 per cent by international
institutions. Private creditors had accounted for just
under 50 per cent in 1973.
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The important role of private financial institutions in
recycling after the first oil shock is obvious. But is it
likely to continue to grow?
There is some evidence that the position is already
changing. In 1980 and in 1981 (according to IMF
forecasts) the proportion of private long-term debt in
total current account finance has fallen sharply, while
official loans have recovered to about a quarter of the
total. There has also been a sudden rise in 'other
financing flows' in 1980 and 1981: this categoly includes
both short term flows and certain IMF and bilateral
monetary authority transactions. Private long-term
debtin forms such as eurodollar syndicated credits
and bond issuesis now diminishing in relative
importance as a source of finance to deal with renewed
balance of payments problems.
The emergence of this pattern coincides with widespread
reappraisal of the role of private financial institutions
in balance of payments financing, and with new initiatives
aimed at increasing the contribution of international
institutions to the adjustment process.2 Five elements
can be discerned in this reappraisal. First, it is
acknowledged that the recent sharp rise in current
account deficits of ldcs is a product not only of the
latest round of oil price increases, but also, in part, of
policy-induced recession in Western industrialised
countries and the increased cost of servicing past
loans. The rise of dollar interest rates to record levels
has greatly added to the debt-service burden of those
countries that resorted to private long-term capital
markets in the 1970s, and is thus an important cause of
the new financing requirements. (Since much of the
debt was contracted in the form of loans at variable
interest rates.) Second, there has been criticism of
private banks as recycling agents on a number of
grounds, the most important of which is that the
distribution of loans that has resulted from the banks'
involvement has favoured middle-income and newly-
industrialising countries (NICs). Killick [1981:981 has
estimated that at the end of 1979, 99.7 per cent of the
net flow of Euromarket lending (ie claims minus
liabilities) was accounted for by just five countries:
Argentina, Brazil, Liberia, Mexico and South Korea.
Thus there is a strong case for alternative arrangements
in the interests of low income countries. Third, there
is some doubt that the private banks will themselves
wish to continue to function as the major recycling
agents. Before 1974 their lending pre-occupations
were for trade credit and project finance, not for
balance of payments support. With increased risk of
default, and growing incidence of rescheduling
zFor more complete discussion of these points see, for example, Dell
and Lawrence 1980; Griffith-Jones l980a, 1980b; Killick 1981; a
fortncoming monograph by Arjun Sengupta and Frances Stewart for
the Centre for Research on the New International Economic Order
will also address both diagnosis and cure.
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requirements, it is probable that the banks will be
seeking some official/international complement to
their own efforts. The ¡MF itself asserts that one
function of its programmes is to act as a catalyst for
the provision of more private credit to ldcs. Fourth,
the surplus countries (especially OPEC) have shown
signs of a similar wish to diversify the mechanisms of
recycling. This is not to say that they are withdrawing
funds from the international banking system, but
rather that they are seeking additional avenues through
which to achieve secure investment of surpluses, an
effective contribution to recycling, and enhanced
political influence. The most obvious example is the
$8 bn loan from Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority to
the IMF, signed in May 1981 [IMF 1981b; Griffith-
Jones 1981 [. Fifth, there is a growing awareness that
the relative strength of the international financial
institutions (especially the IMF and the World Bank)
was actually diminished by the circumstances of the
1970s, and that it should either be revived or
supplemented by new international arrangements.
The World Bank was constrained by its Articles of
Association from extending its financing arrangements
much beyond project lending, while the IMF was
restricted by insufficient increases in quotas or issues
of Special Drawing Rights. Since all IMF lending is a
fixed multiple of country quotas, the fact that, in 1979,
a sixfold increase in quotas would have been required
to restore their ratio to the volume of world imports to
its level at the inception of the IMF, is a dramatic
indicator of the decline in the Fund's relative importance
[estimated by Dell and Lawrence 1980[. This also
means that the international linkage between financing
of deficits and domestic adjustment was not strengthened
during the 1970s, since private banks and bilateral
official donors did not usually impose explicit conditions
about domestic economic management upon borrowers.
Concern at the implications of lack of conditionality
has grown in Western industrialised countries; for
example, in commenting on the possibility of increased
financing via the IMF and the World Bank, after his
return from Fund/World Bank meetings in Libreville,
Gabon in May 1981, the Governor of the Bank of
England, Sir Gordon Richardson, has said:
although these various sources of finance for
developing countries are being promoted and
enlarged, it was an important strand of thinking at
Libreville that such lending should continue to be
accompanied by appropriate programmes for
economic adjustment. This implies that the integrity
of IMF conditionality should be maintained, and
that World Bank lending should be attuned to the
adjustment needs as well as the longer-term
development needs of the borrowing countries.
[Bank of England 1981:246[
Both the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank have responded to the new circumstances with
expanded programmes of 'adjustment' lending to the
ldcs. In the case of the Fund, the multiple of a
country's quota which may be borrowed for balance
of payments support under a variety of arrangements
has been increased, and the Fund is actively increasing
its own borrowing for lending through its new facilities.
The World Bank has likewise introduced a 'structural
adjustment' lending programme designed for countries
'with the prospect of unmanageable deficits arising
from external factors which are not likely to be easily
or quickly reversed' [Wright 1980:21]. The constraint
of the Bank's Articles is being overcome by regarding
the new lending as an extension of programme lending
'in special circumstances'.
Degrees of Conditionality
What are the characteristics of these new programmes?
And what are their likely implications for the
borrowers?
The content of the new IMF lending has been succinctly
summarised by the Fund's Managing Director:
in the period following the first wave of oil price
increases approximately two-thirds of the resources
provided by the Fund to its members were made
available on terms involving a low degree of
conditionality. At present, by contrast, some three-
fourths of our new lending commitments involve
'upper credit tranche' programs, that is, they require
rigorous adjustment policies.
[J. de Larosière, in IMF 1981b:152]
The current structure of IMF facilities is set out in
Table 1. The only completely unconditional facility is
the reserve tranche (ie purchase of a member's own
quota subscription to the Fund); since unused quota
can, in any case, be treated as part of a country's
foreign exchange reserves this facility is of little further
use in situations short of complete inability to pay for
imports. The facilities of low conditionality are not
uniform in their terms. For the buffer stock facility
and the first 50 per cent of drawings under the
compensatory financing facility (CFF) there is virtually
no conditionality once a balance of payments need
has been demonstrated. For the second 50 per cent of
drawings under the CFF, a country must be 'cooperating'
with the Fund to solve its balance of payments difficulties.
First credit tranche programmes are of low condition-
ality in the sense that drawings are not normally
conditional on performance, but they do contain
objectives and performance targets which the borrower
is expected to fulfil. Both the stand-by arrangement
(the common means of access to the upper credit
tranches) and the extended Fund facility (EFF) involve
programmes of full conditionality, with access to
periodic drawingsoften quarterly dependent upon
strict fulfilment of agreed performance criteria. The
stand-by arrangement is normally agreed for one year
at a time and renewed as necessary. The EFF, on the
other hand, envisages a three-year programme of
lending and adjustment, usually with detailed annual
programmes formulated within the extended framework,
and with a longer repayment period. The EFF was
first introduced in 1974; its introduction and subsequent
expansion represent the Fund's chief response to the
view that adjustment programmes might require periods
longer than one year, and that extended loans for
balance of payments support are needed in current
international circumstances.
It can readily be seen that just under two-thirds of the
Fund facilities potentially available to a borrower are
now of high conditionality, even when the borrower is
qualified to make full drawings from the low
conditionality facilities. Ifa country has been badly hit
by oil price increases, high interest costs, and domestic
disruption, and yet has no buffer stock financing
obligations and does not qualify for the CFF, then it is
faced with a virtually immediate move into high
conditionality facilities if it wishes to approach the
Fund at all.
The transformation of the Fund into a lender of
almost exclusively high conditionality is very recent. It
was not characteristic of the international response to
the first round of oil price increases in 1973-74, but
derives from four developments in the structure of the
Fund's facilities. First, quotas have not been increased
sufficiently to keep pace with the growth of world
trade, and there has been no increase in the multiples
of quotas available in the form of low conditionality
facilities. Second, the multiples of quotas available
under stand-by or EFF have been substantially increased;
when the EFF was introduced it added only 65 per
cent of quota to total drawings that could be made.
Third, the oil facility of 1974-76 has not been renewed.
This facility was financed largely by OPEC subscriptions,
and was available to support Ide balances of payments
at very low conditionality. Fourth, the Trust Fund,
inaugurated in 1976 for low-interest lending to ldcs
from the proceeds of IMF gold sales, was fully disbursed
by March 1981. The Trust Fund facility was available
at low conditionality, requiring a one year 'statement
of good intentions' rather less onerous than that required
for the first credit tranche.
All of these features would be of relatively minor
importance if the proportion of Fund financing to
total financing had continued to decline. This, however,
has not happened. Under the programme of 'enlarged
access', formally brought into operation with the Saudi
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table 1
lùnitof maximum
level of drawings as cumulative drawing
conditionality facility % of quota % of quota
unconditional reserve 100
tranche
buffer
stock 50 50
facility
compensatory
low - financing 100 150
conditionality facility
full
conditionalityb
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International Monetary Fund facilities mid-1981
first credit 25 175
tranche
upper credit
tranches 75 250
(stand-by
arrangement)
extended Fund 65 315
facility -
then, either
supplementary
financing
facility and 102.5 417.5
enlarged
access programme
(stand-by)
or
supplementary
financing
facility and
enlarged 140 455
access programme
(extended
arrangement)
a Since the reserve tranche can be counted as part of reserves, whether drawn or not, it is not included in the cumulative total of
additional facilities available.
The Fund retains discretion to increase the multiples available under stand-by and extended arrangements, total outstanding
amounts will not normally exceed 600 per cent of quota
Combined total if upper credit tranches are foregone in favour of EFE
Source: International Monetary Fund 1981d
Arabian loan in May 1981, the Fund expects to make
new lending commitments of the order of $20-25 bn
over the next three years. Thus, in circumstances of
increasing need and possibly declining proportionate
access to private credit, the conditionality of Fund
facilities will assume still greater relevance for ldcs. It
hardly needs emphasising that this will matter most to
the poorest countries, and to those countries which
require IMF facilities and programmes to maintain
their credit-worthiness in private markets.
The new development in World Bank lending is
complementary to trends in Fund facilities. Structural
adjustment lending will be financed out of the general
growth of Bank and International Development
Association (IDA) resources, so that it is to a large
extent a substitute for normal project lending. The
new programme introduces a concept of explicit World
Bank 'conditionality' for the first time. It is not given
this name, but structural adjustment programmes require
that:
a country must be willing to adopt appropriate
changes in its policies and programs to enable its
economy to adapt over a reasonable period to
changes in the international environment without
sacrificing its long-term growth objectives.
[Wright 1980:21]
The components of such a programme are likely to
include efforts to ensure that the current account
balance of payments deficit in the medium term is
commensurate with the expected level of capital inflow,
and strong emphasis on measures to improve productive
efficiency. There may be components dealing with
individual sectors (particularly agriculture and energy),
with the allocation of public investment, and with the
structure of incentives; there appears to be a growing
emphasis on the dismantling of trade controls. There
is thus an obvious aspect of complementarity with
Fund programmes.
The Bank argues that 'prior recourse to the Fund's
facilities is not a prerequisite for structural adjustment
lending' [Wright 1980:221. Nevertheless, since such
lending is intended to be triggered by identified balance
of payments difficulties, it seems unlikely that the
Bank will conclude a structural adjustment programme
with a country that either has no need of Fund
facilities, or is unwilling to approach the Fund. It is
thus also likely that the conditionality involved in
Fund and Bank programmes will be consistent; indeed
a Bank staff member has written that 'the Fund is
guided by the Bank on development matters; the
Bank is guided by the Fund on BOP adjustment'
[Wright 1980:221.
ConditionalityIssues and IMF Responses
The issues of conditionality in the adjustment
programmes required for balance of payments lending
can be broken down into four elements: the economic
theory and analysis informing the programmes, the
period of adjustment, the scope of the programmes
and performance criteria established. Despite the fact
that the body of economic theory underlying Fund
conditionality clearly shapes the Fund's approach to
the other three elements, it is a striking feature of
much of the literature on conditionality (particularly
the critical literature) that the theoretical basis is
largely ignored while the other three elements are
subjected to detailed scrutiny. The most notable
exception to this generalisation is the UNCTAD study
[Dell and Lawrence 1980).
The criticisms of IMF programmes on grounds of
their allowed adjustment periods, scope, and
performance criteria are well known. And the Fund
can reasonably claim to have taken action on all three
counts in response to such criticism.
In lending programmes from the upper tranches prior
to the 1973-74 round of oil price increases, a stand-by
facility was normally accompanied by a one-year
adjustment programme. In other words, the full burden
of achievement of a balance of payments position
acceptable to the IMF had to be borne in one year.
Stand-by arrangements have subsequently envisaged
the possibility of up to three successive one-year
programmes, while the EFF is explicitly designed as a
three-year programme. There is now greater flexibility
over the volume of funds available from stand-by
arrangements and EFF, while the Fund has also
lengthened possible repayment periods.
An internal review of Fund conditionality guidelines
in 1978 resulted in the announcement of revised
guidelines on March 2, 1979 [see IMF 1979:82). The
new guidelines addressed both the scope of Fund
adjustment programmes, and performance criteria.
In the past, Fund adjustment programmes have been
regularly criticised on the grounds that they ignored
long-term development objectives, especially growth
and distribution issues, while emphasising short-term
stabilisation and balance of payments equilibrium
objectives. This, it has been argued, has proved costly
in terms of disruption to national development efforts
and worsening of income distribution, with no
countervailing gain from lasting stabilisation
achievements. The Fund has also been criticised for
failing to differentiate among the causes of balance of
payments disequilibria, and thus for failing to address
important reforms of policy changes that might
contribute to successful adjustment. The Fund's response
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to such criticisms has been to include the following
item in its new guidelines:
in helping members to devise adjustment programs,
the Fund will pay due regard to the domestic social
and political objectives, the economic priorities,
and the circumstances of members, including the
causes of their balance of payments problems.
[IMF 1979:821
The Fund already distinguishes between deficits which
are short-term and self-correcting (ie cyclical and
eligible for CFF support) and those which are 'structural'
and chronic, requiring programmes of adjustment
supported by stand-bys or EFF. In practice, however,
there is no further distinction, within the 'structural'
deficits, between those which have internal causes
and those which are of external origin.
The Fund has also given renewed emphasis to 'supply
management and the structural problems of members'
IMF 1981c:3] and the Managing Director himself has
stressed that, in addition to addressing problems of
demand management, the Fund 'now systematically
emphasise(s) the development of the productive base
of the economy' [quoted in IMF 1981c:2).
The performance criteria of IMF programmes are the
quantitative targets for macro-economic variables,
such as the level of domestic credit or foreign borrowing,
which a country is required to meet if the programme
is to be fulfilled and further instalments of Fund credit
are to be released. These have been criticised on
grounds of rigidity, narrowness and, sometimes, of
irrelevance to the development problems of a particular
countly. In this case, the Fund's response has been to
stress the potential flexibility of the criteria, and to
argue that restriction to quantifiable macro-economic
variables minimises the degree of interference with a
country's domestic distributional or other priorities.
The Fund has gone so far as to assert that:
the impact of Fund-supported programmes on other
economic variables, such as income distribution,
employment, and social services, depends on the
manner in which the relevant policies are
implemented. Decisions on the detailed execution
of policy measures are naturally the sole responsibility
of the government. [IMF 1981c:2[
Given the manner in which much criticism of the
Fund has been formulated, it is perhaps not surprising
that the response has been of this order. It is the
contention of this article that the features of Fund-
supported adjustment programmes cannot simply be
dismissed as the product of an ideological preference,
or as the result of lack of recognition of social and
distributional issues. They are more appropriately
seen as deeply embedded in the dominant strain of
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economic analysis which is articulated within the
Fund. Until this is recognised, and until a response is
developed which, for each country, offers an alternative
which can be convincingly placed alongside the Fund's
analysis, it is unlikely that the general shape and
impact of Fund conditionality will be greatly altered.
To put the point another way: current international
efforts to reform the international monetary system,
and efforts to expand the access of the poorest countries
to financing through multilateral institutions, must be
complemented by substantial technical efforts to
strengthen the macro-economic policy frameworks of
the Ides.
The Fund itself denies that its programmes are based
upon a uniform approach to economic policy [IMF
l981c:21. The evidence of Fund literature, however,
suggests, at the very least, that the approach described
below is the main source of both programme emphasis
and performance criteria.3 It may well be constrained
in particular circumstances by the Fund's Articles, by
the facilities at its disposal, and by local conditions;
but it is hard to accept that actual programmes have
been significantly influenced by alternative approaches
to economic analysis.4
Economic Theory and Fund Conditionality
The theoretical approach to macro-economic policy
employed by the Fund is formally known as the
monetary approach to the balance of payments. The
academic elaboration of this approach is usually
associated with the University of Chicago, but its use
and development within the Fund pre-dates significant
modern academic input. According to the Fund's own
volume of research papers on the monetary approach
to the balance of payments [IMF 1977) the impetus
towards its development within the Fund came from
work on the payments problems of Ides, especially
those of Latin America, during the 1950s. In addition
to the 'gap between problems that could easily be
solved with the help of Keynesian tools and those
frequently encountered by officials concerned with
monetary and balance of payments questions' [IMF
1977:61, there were four motives adduced for use of
new methods in work on ide problems. First, there
were statistical difficulties; statistics of monetary
aggregates were more readily forthcoming than up to
date and detailed national income accounts. Second,
there were computing difficulties during Fund staff
missions to foreign capitals:
See, for example, the regular editions of IMF Staff Papers, and
especially the Fund's own volume of papers setting out its staff
contributions to development of the monetary approach I IMF 1977].
An interesting critical paper on the monetary approach by a Fund
official I Blackwell 1978] serves to confirm the dominance of the
approach in Fund programmes.
The contents of IMF programmes have been discussed in Killick
1980]. Dell and Lawrence I 19801 and in Beveridge and Kelly 1980].
the monetary approach permits a meaningful
approximate analysis of the relevant aggregates
with the help of models that are small enough to be
calculated with pencil and paper. [IMF 1977:61
Third, it was claimed that with undeveloped capital
markets and financial instruments, the impact of excess
domestic credit creation upon the balance of payments
was more 'obtrusive' in ldcs than in dcs. Fourth, it was
observed that control of domestic credit was already
relied upon as a major instrument of demand
management and balance of payments control. In
summary, according to the Fund itself, the monetary
approach to income analysis and the balance of payments
was developed and deployed for a series of contingent
and practical reasons, not theoretical or ideological
ones.
The best known exposition of the approach is probably
that by the Fund's former Economic Counsellor and
Head of the Research Department, J. J. Polak, who is
now Executive Director for the Netherlands at the
Fund's Board [Polak 19571. Apart from the Fund's
own volume of research papers on the subject [IMF
1977], there is a substantial academic elaboration of
the model and its implications in Frenkel and Johnson
119761. There is also a growing number of empirical
applications of the model in ldc case studies, and one
recent attempt at direct comparison between the
results of the monetary approach and a simple Keynesian
model for Kenya over the period 1963-73 [King 1979].
The fact that the approach has been, and continues to
be, subjected to a great deal of empirical testing and
subsequent elaboration is clearly one of its great
strengths. In the absence of strong competition, its
further acceptance by governments and international
organisations seems likely.
The theoretical approach to macro-economic policy
which underlies the Fund's stabilisation programmes
is 'monetarist' in the sense that it takes changes in the
money supply to be the primary determinant of changes
in total spending. It is cast in nominal terms rather
than real terms, and is formalised in terms of financial
stocks and flows rather than real stocks and flows; it
implies that changes in monetary aggregates have a
direct impact upon the balance of payments and the
level of nominal national income. The approach has,
however, been elaborated in a different context from
the monetarism currently being practised by a number
of Western governments, and therefore has distinctive
features which influence its application in ldcs.5 Most
Strictly, by no means all IMF economists or exponents of a similar
approach claim to be monetarists: while there is still controversy
about the role of monetarism in solving problems of inflation and
unemployment, the monetary approach all the proponents of which
are not necessarily monetarists' in the narrower sensehas come to
occupy a central role in the analysis of balance of payments problems'
IMF 1977:2!.
obviously, it assumes limited development of capital
markets and financial instruments, and therefore assigns
a limited role to monetary policy per se. Instead of
attempting to manipulate the 'supply of money', the
approach concentrates on the rate of domestic credit
expansion and thence upon aggregate fiscal policy.
Since it is commonly argued that the private sector's
demand for credit is either relatively low or more
easily influenced by indirect methods (interest rates or
taxation), the burden of credit adjustments tends to
fall on the public sector. Thus monetary policy and
fiscal policy do not run in opposite directions, as they
have tended to do in Britain from 1979-81. It is from
this component of the approach that the public
expenditure cutting, tax-raising component of Fund
programmes is derived, as is the setting of performance
criteria based on such measures as domestic credit to
government and public authorities.
In important respects, this amendment to dc monetarism
would meet with the approval of a wide range of
economists: both neo-classical and mainstream
Keynesian economists would have little difficulty in
agreeing that, with a given economic structure, price
levels and levels of capital inflow, aggregate fiscal
policy will determine the balance of payments out-
turn in a small open economy. If, for one reason or
another, excess demand cannot be met from imports,
then aggregate fiscal policy will also affect the rate of
inflation. The argument begins over how to apply this
generalisation to the process of balance of payments
adjustment in individual countries.
More controversially, the model implies that an increase
in exports (or a reduction in imports through import
restrictions) will raise the money supply and nominal
national income, but will not of itself correct a balance
of payments deficit. Similarly, any increase in domestic
credit creation, brought about, for example, by higher
government spending will inevitably be translated into
an equivalent loss of reserves. This is because the
balance of payments is viewed as the monetary
expression of the difference between total spending
and total income, while increases in the money
supplywhether through increased export earnings
or domestic credit creationwill automatically result
in increased spending (or outflows by other means if
residents decide to hold funds abroad).
These conclusions are critically dependent upon the
assumptions of the model, in particular that of a
constant velocity of circulation of money and the
absence of domestic leakages (such as forms of saving
which do not lead to increased spending by anyone
else). They do, however, explain why, according to
the monetary approach, there is one and only one way
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to restore lasting balance in external payments
irrespective of the source of the problem: demand
deflation to achieve a reduction in the level of domestic
credit. The approach acknowledges, however, that a
faster rise in nominal income may make it easier to
impose the measures necessary (eg higher taxes) to
reduce domestic credit expansion and thus the balance
of payments deficit. It also acknowledges that rises in
nominal income (from export expansion/import
restriction/credit creation) may become rises in real
income 'depending upon the elasticity of supply' [Polak
1957:29].
There is thus room in the approach for measures to
promote the growth of real income. In formal terms,
however, the Fund's emphasis is normally upon
promoting movements along the supply curve for
particular goods rather than altering its position or
slope. In practical terms, the Fund's methods of
promoting growth with a sustainable balance of payments
are dependent upon the interpretation of its Articles
of Agreement. These Articles incorporate the view
that free trade and the unhindered operation of markets
are conducive to international welfare, whereas
governmental controls on trade and intervention in
markets have harmful effects. Thus the Fund does not
encourage the use of quantitative restrictions on trade
and payments (and tries, where possible, to have them
removed), nor does it emphasise administrative,
institutional or other forms of structural change to
promote the expansion of exports. It is common in
Fund programmes and public statements for the main
emphasis to be given to the elimination of price
distortions as the instrument for promoting growth
while maintaining an acceptable balance of payments.
The price distortions regularly involved are overvalued
exchange rates and underpriced public sector
servicesin both cases the diagnosis of excessive real
wages is often the main reason for the prescription.
Reduction in real wages will assist in reducing the
public sector deficit, and in improving the
competitiveness of import-competing and export
industries.
The 'removal of distortions' aspect of Fund programmes,
and the rejection of direct controls as a means to
reduce a payments deficit, can introduce a policy
conflict which is difficult to resolve within the analytical
framework of the monetary approach. It follows from
the model that in a small open economy, the instrument
with strongest effect upon the level of domestic prices
is the exchange rate. If the domestic currency is
devalued as part of a general deflationary or price-
adjusting package the rate of inflation accelerates.
The aims of the devaluation will only be achieved if
nominal wage increases can be kept below the increase
in the price level or (which amounts to the same thing)
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if productivity increases. These outcomes are dependent
upon the structure of the labour market. In the meantime
the only instrument which can have an immediate
impact on the price level has been moved in an
inflationary direction. The effectiveness of the policy
choice, in its own terms, may often depend upon
additional measures (trade union restrictions, for
example) to achieve a reduction in real wages. The
cost could be political and social disturbance, accelerated
inflation or bothleading to the events graphically
described by the Brandt Commission as 'IMF riots'.
General Models and Particular Economies
The success of programmes based upon the monetary
approach to the balance of payments depends not
only upon the theoretical validity of the model itself. It
also depends upon the mechanism by which, within
the model, adjustment of each variable to its new level
takes place. On the one hand, this can be specified
differently in different elaborations of the model (once
we abandon the use of 'equilibrium conditions' in each
case). On the other hand, the mechanism specified
may be inaccurate in the context of a particular
country, or the conditions of a particular time. For
example, we need only to ask the following questions
to appreciate the high degree of risk inherent in using
a uniform model of economic adjustment over a range
of different cases: What is the mechanism for
transmission of domestic inflation? Can real wages be
reduced? What is the cost? What determines the
supply response of producers of various agricultural
crops? Does a change in the exchange rate alter the
relative prices of traded and non-traded goods?
When such questions are posed in this form, it is
evident that substantial empirical research, not to
mention sensitive political judgments, might well be
necessary to answer the questions in a manner relevant
to an individual country's economic policy.
Despite this, the monetary approach continues to be
applied in a largely uniform manner. It is reinforced,
on the one hand, by the ease with which it yields
'objective' performance criteria, and, on the other, by
the absence of any real alternative that incorporates
not only different objectives but also a different analysis
of economic reality. To say this is not to deny that the
monetary approach can yield useful insights in many
cases. Nor is it to deny that programmes involving
deflation, exchange rate adjustments, removal of
subsidies and so on are sometimes necessary. The
point is that while adjustment programmes may be
required across a wide range of countries, there is no
reason why they should each be largely uniform in
content or based upon the same approach to economic
analysis.
Now that the role of the Fund and the Bank in
recycling is being greatly enhanced and, as we have
seen, the proportion of Fund and Bank finance that is
disbursed with conditionality has been radically
increased, the content of conditionality has assumed
far greater importance than it had in the past. If, as has
been argued here, the theoretical basis of Fund
conditionality remains largely unchanged, then the
possible implications for the re-cycling process are
serious.
As has happened in the past, countries may simply
refuse to approach the IMF for assistance or may
suspend programmes before completion if they judge
the required conditionality to be unacceptable. A
variety of countries have adopted this position from
time to time, including Brazil, India, Ivory Coast,
Jamaica, Tanzania and Kenya. Even though almost all
the countries listed have subsequently agreed or
requested further programmes with the Fund, the
issue of conditionality has meant that these countries
have followed financing and adjustment patterns which
might not have been their preferred or best approach.
The Fund itself has complained that countries often
make a request for assistance only at the last possible
momentwhen the balance of payments position has
deteriorated to an extent that requires a severe
adjustment programme. The Fund argues that
conditionality would be less burdensome if countries
were to discuss a possible programme as soon as the
onset of a balance of payments problem is perceived.
A vicious circle has thus been created: because countries
are waiy of conditionality, they approach the Fund
only when they have run out of alternatives and are
too weak to resist a severe programme; it then appears
internationally that only countries in dire straits approach
the Fund, and that a severe adjustment programme is
an automatic accompaniment of Fund lending. Until
the circle is broken, it is difficult to envisage successful
recycling and adjustment via the Fund.
Because the balance of payments positions of a large
number of countries are already extremely serious, it
is possible that more countries will be forced to have
recourse to the Fund, irrespective of their views on
conditionality. Indeed, during May 1981 the Fund's
Managing Director stated that the Fund currently has
economic programmes with 32 member countries,
compared with an annual average of 10 during the
years 1974-78 1IMF 1981b:152]. The risk is therefore
increased that, if conditionality continues to be imposed
in the familiar manner, more countries will either fail
to meet the performance criteria and lose access to
Fund resources, or will meet the criteria at heavy cost
to their economies and societies in other respects.
Detailed descriptions of cases in which this has occurred
in the past are contained in Dell and Lawrence 19801.
In order to break out of the vicious circle, and to make
the new Bank/IMF recycling a potential success,
there is a strong case for change in the basis of
adjustment programmes. If this cannot be achieved,
then it is likely that the call for an international
financial alternative to the IMF, with greater ldc
influence, will be strengthenedonly to meet with
resistance again from the 'North' and thus a further
impasse.
Prospects and Possibilities
The Fund itself devotes .a great deal of effort to
examining, refining and testing its own approach. It is
now necessary to broaden the scope of these inquiries,
both by bringing alternative approaches to bear on
stabilisation problems (as the Fund already claims to
do, but with little evident result in its programmes),
and by conducting the debate in more varied forums
and at different levels of technical sophistication.
Without stepping too far outside the framework of the
monetary approach to the balance of payments, it
would be possible for certain key aspects of the model
to be tested more critically.
For example, the monetary approach divides the
'base' of the money supply into two components:
foreign reserves and domestic credit. When foreign
reserves fluctuate with balance of payments changes,
it is assumed that the domestic money supply will also
fluctuate and can only be controlled by expansions or
contractions in credit creation. No allowance is made
for the possible use of direct methods (such as stabilisation
funds) to 'sterilise' new foreign earnings, spread their
monetary and fiscal impact over time, and permit a
stable trend of domestic credit growth instead of a
counter-cyclical one. Are these presumptions
correct?
How stable has the velocity of circulation of money in
ides been in recent years? And has there in fact been a
stable relationship between growth of the money
supply (according to some relevant measure) and
changes in nominal income? What is the effect of the
diversification of financial markets and instruments
upon the model and derived performance criteria
(and on the definition of the supply of money)? Are
supply elasticities commonly found to be such that an
increase in demand will affect prices and/or the balance
of payments, rather than output? Different answers to
these questions from those currently implicit in the
design of Fund programmes would clearly have far-
reaching effects.
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But if the wider requirements of Ides and critics of the
Fund are to be met, it will be necessary to go a good
deal further than is implied by the empirical testing of
a model of the monetary approach. Dell and Lawrence
11980:72] describe the Kenyan experience of combining
World Bank and IMF lending in a programme that
attempted to link short-term stabilisation policy with
longer-run goals for economic development. The
programme was not completed because agreement
was not reached between Kenya and the Fund on the
budgetary aspects of the annual programme for the
second year of an Extended Fund Facility. It also
involved complicated three-cornered negotiations which
were extremely demanding on the time and technical
resources of an ldc government. Nevertheless, it provides
an indication of future possibilities. The important
question is whether these possibilities can be successfully
developed while the Fund adheres to programmes
based on the monetary approach.
In addition to questions about the validity of the
model itself, the Fund's deployment of it has four
further problematic features. First, the content of
progràmmes is remarkably uniform in an increasingly
diverse world. Second, the Fund argues that the
programmes are in principle neutral with respect to
income distribution issues, and that distribution is
only affected by governments' choices over the manner
of implementation. Third, although the Fund now
emphasises the importance of growth, it restricts the
promotion of growth to 'supply management' and, in
turn, concentrates upon manipulation of a rather
blunt range of instruments (eg the exchange rate) to
provide the correct price signals for improvement of
supply conditions. Fourth, it is often alleged that Fund
programmes involve a shift of resources from public
to private sectors, irrespective of the goals of the
countries concerned. If this is true, it is reinforced by
the Fund's theoretical approach, given the vital role
assigned to public sector borrowing and elimination of
price distortions. In other words, there is at present
very limited scope for programmes tailored precisely
to the structural characteristics and development
objectives of individual countries; there is no scope
for incorporation of quantitative distributional criteria,
and there is almost no recognition that increased
production may be constrained much more by structural
or administrative problems than by price distortions.
Can the ldcs themselves provide an alternative? In
some cases the answer in the short run must be no.
There are countries whose need for finance is now so
desperate that the conditions upon which it is made
available seem almost irrelevant. There are also countries
whose political, institutional or administrative capacity
for macro-economic management is severely limited.
In these cases, the burden of providing finance and
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providing it on suitable terms, lies outsideand
particularly with the IMF.
But an approach built solely around the short-term
requirements of the desperate cases is not a satisfactory
one for the rest of the world, or in the longer term. If
an administration is presumed capable of carrying out
an IMF-approved programme of adjustment, it is
reasonable to suggest that the same administration
could formulate its own programmeperhaps with
some assistance from sympathetic outsiders and
international organisations. If ldcs could do this, and
obtain financial support for such a programme from
either private lenders or official sources or both, then
the way would be open to invite the Fund and the
Bank to support such programmes too. In a manner of
speaking, this is what Brazil has been doing for some
years. Peru explicitly attempted such an arrangement
with private lenders in 1976, but the programme broke
down after a short period.
Although the Fund, again, states that it favours
applications from countries with programme proposals
of their own, the unfortunate reality is that if a possible
programme is discussed with the Fund and agreement
cannot be reached, international banking circles are
likely to know that the attempt has failed and to mark
down the 'credit-worthiness' of the country concerned.
Hence, countries with their own clear ideas about
adjustment priorities are doubly reticent about
approaching the Fund.
The efforts of ldcs in this direction would have a
greater chance of success if individual countries (and
development economists) paid more systematic attention
to the linkage between macro-economic stabilisation
policy and development strategy, and organised the
first explicitly to support the second.6 This requires,
first, that the development effort be sustainable over
time provided that the stabilisation framework remains
intact and estimates of external developments (prices,
capital flows) do not prove wildly wrong; and, second,
that the assignment of instruments to targets in macro-
economic policy should be such that it is clear which
instruments must be manipulated in order to cope
with an external shock. In the past, development
economists (and development plans) have been pre-
occupied with the allocation of resources among
potential usersoriginally among productive invest-
ments, more recently, too, among social groupsand
also with the 'mobilisation' of resources; there has
been less interest in the domestic mechanics of how
that 'mobilisation' is sustained over time so that the
chosen allocation can have practical effect. That is
the role of a macro-economic stabilisation framework.
6For an account of an attempt to do this, see the Papua New Guinea
case in Garnaut 1981, forthcoming.
This is not intended to suggest that international
economic developments do not have dominant impact
on the options open to ldcs. Nor is it intended to
disregard the 'asymmetry of adjustment', je the fact
that the burden of adjustment falls on the deficit and
not the surplus countries, but this issue is beyond the
scope of this paper. It is rather to argue that macro-
economic management matters as much as development
planning if there is to be any room for manoeuvre at
all. It is also to suggest (as undoubtedly the Fund
would agree) that a short-term programme of macro-
economic management is not only needed when a
crisis is at hand and it must be called an 'adjustment
programme'; it should, instead, be an integral and
continuing component of development planning.
Beyond this, it is unlikely that Fund programmes will
take explicit account of income distribution issues, or
of structural constraints on economic growth, until
the ldcs themselves link these to development planning
and place them firmly on the agenda for discussion. In
the case of income distribution, this requires both
quantitative targets, (perhaps in the manner suggested
by some elaborations of the 'basic needs' approach)
and an understanding of how the manipulation of
macro-economic instruments, the tax burden, and
public expenditure affects distribution. On the removal
of domestic structural barriers to new output (eg land
reform, or overhaul of agricultural extension services),
there is no international substitute at all for the
programme of an ldc government. In both cases, the
World Bank could wield a positive influence; but the
linkage between structural adjustment lending and
IMF programmes once again brings back the limitations
of the monetary approach to the balance of payments.
It may be objected that what is proposed here is no
more than has always been necessary, but has proved
elusive either because of international disruption, or
because of conflicting interests within ldcs themselves.
Truebut unless a constructive critique of the monetary
approach to the balance of payments and its application
is now mounted, and alternative adjustment programmes
are urgently propounded by ldcs, it is probable that
the new recycling round will be considerably less
satisfactory from the perspective of the ldcs than even
the chequered experience of the 1970s.
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